We d escribe an efficient system for ensuring code integrity of an operating system (OS), both its own code and application code. The proposed system can protect from an attacker who has full control over the OS kernel. An evaluation of the system's performance suggests the induced overhead is negligible.
1.
Behavioral: These systems analyze the behavior (e.g., network or hard-drive activity) of the system and compare the current with a predefined behavior. If these behaviors differ, the environment is considered breached. 2. Signature oriented: These systems contain a database of code samples that are known to be malicious. Every loaded executable is scanned, and if it contains a code sample that is present in the database, the environment is considered breached. Most antivirus programs can be categorized as signature oriented. 3. White-list oriented: These systems contain a database of allowed executables. The criteria used for white listing are frequently based on one or more file attributes (e.g., file path or cryptographic hash). 2 Unlike in signature-based systems, only listed executables are allowed to run. These systems typically intercept every loaded executable and check whether it is contained within the database. If it is not, the environment is considered breached.
The strength of behavioral systems is difficult to evaluate, because these systems are based on heuristics. 4 Signature-based systems can protect only against attacks that were previously discovered and analyzed, and are, therefore, ineffective against zero-day attacks. 3 White-list-based systems provide the strongest protection guarantees 5 but are also the most restricting. For example, before a user can install a new program, the system administrator must add the program to the white-list database. Typically, white-list enforcement is performed by intercepting executable images at their load time (e.g., by intercepting system calls). 6 In the event of a vulnerability, exploitation becomes possible in runtime. 7, 8 Nonetheless, in environments that tend not to change frequently, the preferred option is a white-list-based system.
Protection systems differ not only in their modus operandi, but also in their mechanisms for self-protection. The system must protect its white-list database and also itself. Some systems use agent-network verifiers that periodically checksum different portions of the system. 9 Others store their critical code in kernel mode [the operating system (OS) privilege level], assuming, reasonably, that the OS is less vulnerable to attacks than regular programs. 10 Due to their relatively large attack surface, OSs 1. In our method, control of the execution of a given executable image (both in user mode and kernel mode) is enforced throughout its entire lifetime. 2. In our method, the system can prevent execution of unauthorized code even when an attacker has full control over the OS kernel.
We consider an attacker who has 1) remote access to the machine and 2) full control over the OS kernel and peripherals. In addition, we assume that the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface firmware is trusted. We argue that, given the described attacker with full control, our system can withstand 1) malicious code execution in user mode or kernel mode and 2) attacks that involve malicious direct memory access (DMA) writes using peripherals. To provide such strong security guarantees, our approach uses a hypervisor. We show that the performance degradation due to the proposed system is negligible.
A hypervisor is a software module that is able to monitor and control the execution of an OS. These capabilities are provided by an extension to the original processor's instruction set and are typically referred to as virtualization extensions. Virtualization extensions are available on processors designed by Intel (VT-x), 11 AMD (AMD-V), and ARM (virtualization extensions). Our method is implemented on Intel processors but can be easily ported to AMD and ARM. In the "Limitations and Future Work" section, we discuss how our method can be ported to the ARM architecture. Throughout this article, we refer to the entity wanting to protect the system as the system administrator.
Virtual Machine Extensions
Many modern processors are equipped with a set of extensions to their basic instruction set architecture that enable them to execute multiple OSs simultaneously. This article discusses Intel's implementation of these extensions, which they call virtual machine extensions (VMX). The software that governs the execution of the OSs is called a hypervisor, and each OS (with the processes it executes) is called a guest. Transitions from the hypervisor to the guest are called vm-entries, and transitions from the guest to the hypervisor are vm-exits. While vm-entries are carried out voluntarily by the hypervisor, vm-exits are caused by some event that occurs during the guest's execution. The events may be synchronous, e.g., execution of an INVLPG instruction, or asynchronous, e.g., a page-fault or general-protection exception. The event that causes a vm-exit is recorded for future use by the hypervisor. A special data structure called the virtual machine control structure (VMCS) allows the hypervisor to specify the events that should trigger a vm-exit as well as many other settings for the guest.
Intel's Extended Page Table ( EPT), a technology generally called Secondary Level Address Translation (SLAT), allows the hypervisor to configure a mapping between the physical address space as it is perceived by a guest and the real physical address space. Similar to the virtual page table, EPT allows the hypervisor to specify the access rights for each guest's physical page. When a guest attempts to access a page that either is not mapped or has inappropriate access rights, an event called an EPT violation occurs, triggering a vm-exit.
An input-output (I/O) memory management unit (IOMMU) specifies the mapping of the physical address space as perceived by the hardware devices to the real physical address space. It is a technology complementary to the EPT that allows the hypervisor to construct a coherent guest physical address space for both the OS and the devices.
System Description
The system described in this article consists of a Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) 12 application and an executable scanner. The executable scanner creates a white-list database that stores hashes of executable images' pages within an initially trusted system. The UEFI application initializes a hypervisor that monitors the execution of the system by running the OS as a guest. Whenever the guest attempts to execute a page that was not previously approved, a vm-exit occurs. The hypervisor computes the hash of the page to be executed and compares it to the appropriate record in the database. If a match is found, then the page is given execution rights, and the hypervisor performs a vm-entry to continue the normal execution of the system.
We use the UEFI secure boot feature to guarantee the integrity of the UEFI application before it is executed by the UEFI firmware. The UEFI application reads the white-list database from the disk into the main memory and then initializes a hypervisor. The hypervisor configures the EPT and the IOMMU such that the white-list database and the hypervisor's code and data are not accessible either from the guest or from a hardware device.
Preparations
The system administrator needs to scan an initially trusted system and install the necessary files on a target
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User Mode Scanning
The executable scanner runs on an initially trusted system. It recursively looks for all executable images: specifically, executables and shared objects. In x86-64, memory accesses are instruction pointer relative. That is, the access offset to local symbols can be computed in advance by the static linker. Therefore, modifications to code that reference local symbols will not be needed in runtime. An executable image may have many runtime dependencies, which are handled by the dynamic linker. Fortunately, in Linux, the dynamic linker performs modifications only to the data segment of the executable image. Therefore, the executable scanner simply hashes the executable segment of every executable or shared object, at a page-level granularity, and stores the results consecutively in the database. Figure 1 depicts the process. After all executable images are scanned, the scanner lexicographically sorts the hashes.
Kernel Mode Scanning
The Linux kernel is composed of a statically linked executable image (vmlinux) and potentially loaded kernel modules. Kernel modules are different from executable and shared-object files in their nature of execution. This difference is reflected in two ways.
■ Kernel modules are linked into the running kernel upon loading. That is, resolving of internal/external used symbols is undertaken solely by the kernel. These modifications vary between resets, as kernel modules are not loaded to fixed addresses. ■ The Linux kernel performs various static/dynamic modifications to the loaded code. For example, when the Linux kernel is compiled with ftrace, it reserves the first 5 bytes of each function for its internal tracer. These bytes are patched to no-ops at load time. Other possible modifications, which can be disabled or enabled in compilation time, are jump labels, paravirt operations (x86-specific), and alternatives. Fortunately, most of these modifications take place only at load time.
The user mode executable-image scanning process has many advantages: 1) a simple white-list database structure, 2) reduced runtime monitoring complexity, and 3) reduced runtime monitoring performance overhead. The white-list database is simply composed of lexicographically sorted hashes. The latter allow the hypervisor to quickly look for a match. In addition, its code can be kept to a minimum. Similar to user mode, the Linux kernel, by default, aligns code sections on page boundaries to ensure complete separation of the code and the data. In addition, as explained, most of the modifications take place only at load time. To retain the executable-scanner user mode modus operandi for kernel modules, we performed the following steps.
During its initialization, the Linux kernel may
optionally mount an initial ramdisk (initramfs), if found. The purpose of the initial ramdisk is to mount the root file system. In many Linux distributions (mainly general distributions), the initramfs also includes kernel modules, because the machine on which the kernel will run is not known in advance. We built the latest stable Linux kernel to date (4.15.10, 19.03.2018) on a random machine, having all the necessary modules statically compiled into the kernel. The latter can be achieved using localyesconfig make target. Because the necessary kernel modules are statically compiled into the kernel, it was not necessary to boot the system with an initial ramdisk. Figure 1 . In our process, (a) the user mode executable image to be signed is composed of one code segment, divided into virtual pages. Each page is signed using secure hash algorithm 1 (SHA1), and the result is stored in (b) the white-list database. VPN: virtual page number; SIG: signature.
We booted up the system (Ubuntu 16.04.4 LTS)
with the just-built kernel and disabled kaslr. Afterward, we scanned the kernel directly from the main memory. Because the executable scanner cannot directly access kernel space memory (as it executes in user mode), the hypervisor provides a hypercall service that can be used to compute a hash of a given kernel page. The executable scanner uses this service to generate hashes of all active kernel pages. These hashes are written directly into the white-list database consecutively (just as in user mode applications).
It is worth noting that all the information regarding possible kernel-code modifications, both in kernel modules and the kernel image, is located within the corresponding images. In addition, the initial ramdisk can be mounted and scanned by the executable scanner. However, we chose to omit these capabilities from the executable scanner and the hypervisor due to the induced overhead and complexity.
Configuring Secure Boot
Secure boot is a feature provided by UEFI that allows a computer system owner to authenticate UEFI applications prior to their execution, thereby protecting the executable image from malicious modifications. The UEFI specification defines four nonvolatile variables used to control secure boot: ■ platform key (pk) ■ key exchange key (kek) ■ signature database (db) ■ forbidden signature database (dbx).
The most prominent variables are the platform key and the key exchange key. The platform key can contain one entry at most, typically, an x509 public key that belongs to the hardware vendor. The platform key can be used to sign kek keys. The kek variable may contain more than one entry. Each of the kek keys can be used to sign trusted executable images. Typically, the kek variable contains one or more keys that belong to the OS vendor. The db variable holds a white-list database of executable images, whereas the dbx variable holds a blacklist database of executable images. Updates to the db and dbx variables need to be signed using one of the keys within the kek variable.
Obviously, without knowing the private keys of the OS vendor, it is not possible to manipulate the secure boot variables. However, it is possible to rewrite all the keys. This process is referred to as taking control over the platform. Alternatively, it is possible to use an application called SHIM, which is signed by Microsoft. SHIM validates and loads another application. The validation is performed against a special boot-serviceonly (i.e., it can be manipulated only during boot) UEFI variable, MokList. Unlike the secure boot variables, MokList can be modified without providing the private key of the OS vendor. Typically, SHIM launches a MokList-management application that allows modifying the MokList variable in case the boot validation process failed. At this point, it is possible to add the signature of the desired UEFI application to the MokList.
To utilize secure boot, for the sake of our UEFI application verification, the system administrator has two options. Steps for option 1 are as follows.
1. Reset the platform key. This can be done by entering UEFI setup mode. 2. Create key pairs for kek, db, and pk. 3. Write these just-created keys to the corresponding UEFI variables in the specified order. 4. Sign our UEFI application using the created kek or db keys. 5. Copy the resultant signed UEFI application to the ESP partition. 6. Reboot the system.
Steps for option 2 are as follows.
Copy the SHIM and the MokList-management
applications into the ESP partition. 2. Reboot the system. 3. Add our UEFI application signature to MokList using the MokList-management application. 4. Reboot the system.
Target Installation
When the system's boot mode is configured to UEFI after a successful start-up, the UEFI boot manager loads a sequence of executable images, called UEFI applications. The UEFI firmware stores the location at which these images reside in nonvolatile storage. The boot sequence can be configured using the firmware setup screen. The UEFI boot manager loads an executable image into the main memory, undertakes the necessary fixups, and executes its main routine. If the entry routine returns, the UEFI boot manager proceeds to the next executable image, if there is one. The UEFI application's entry routine may also not return. A typical example of the latter is an OS loader implemented as a UEFI application.
The system described in this article is implemented as a UEFI application. A system administrator interested in installing the system needs to perform the following steps.
1. Configure secure boot (as described in the previous section).
2. Install the UEFI application into a location accessible by the firmware (e.g., a USB stick or a Trivial File Transfer Protocol server). 3. Install the white-list database file into a storage device that is accessible by the firmware. We recommend it be placed within the ESP partition on which the UEFI application resides.
Operation
The UEFI application, during its execution, obtains the white-list database file from the disk, initializes a hypervisor, and returns to UEFI firmware. The UEFI firmware then proceeds to the next boot option, which is typically the OS bootloader. The hypervisor remains in the main memory and continues its operation even after the application terminates. The hypervisor is set to detect code execution attempts in both user mode and kernel mode. When such an attempt is detected, the hypervisor verifies the page to be executed using its white-list database. In the case of a valid hash, the hypervisor resumes the execution of the guest. The rest of this section provides a detailed explanation of the initialization and operation of the system.
Initialization
The UEFI application starts by allocating a persistent memory block (i.e., the memory block can be used even after the application terminates) using UEFI boot services. The UEFI application loads the white-list database into the allocated memory block using UEFI's file I/O services. The UEFI application then verifies the authenticity of the white-list database using our built-in hard-coded certificate. It next allocates another persistent memory block and initializes a hypervisor. During the hypervisor initialization, the EPT and the IOMMU are set up. Both the EPT and the IOMMU define not only the mapping of the perceived page but also its access rights. The hypervisor sets the EPT and IOMMU mappings by performing the following steps.
1. The hypervisor sets an identity mapping between the real physical address space and the guest physical address space. This is done by configuring the EPT such that guest physical page X translates to host physical page X. Fortunately, setting up identity mapping between the real physical address space and the I/O peripherals physical address space is trivial, as the page-table hierarchy used by the EPT can also be used by the IOMMU. 2. The hypervisor sets the access rights of the hypervisor's code and data to read-only. This step ensures that malicious code, even if it executes in kernel mode, cannot modify the hypervisor's code and data.
3. The hypervisor sets the access rights of the remaining physical address space to write-only. This step ensures that any execution attempt will trigger a vm-exit, thus allowing the hypervisor to validate the faulting page. Figure 2 illustrates the physical address space as it is perceived by the guest and I/O peripherals.
System Monitoring
The hypervisor waits for an EPT violation to occur. When a vm-exit occurs, the processor saves the guest's state to VMCS, loads the hypervisor's state from VMCS, and begins execution of the hypervisor's predefined vm-exit handler. The handler checks whether the vm-exit was due to an EPT violation. Within the information stored in VMCS are the reason for the EPT violation and the guest physical address that caused it. Due to the nature of our method, a page can be either executable or writable but not both. Therefore, all EPT violations are attributed to an attempt to write or to execute.
■ If the violation was due to a write attempt, the hypervisor removes the execute rights from the violating page, grants it write rights, and performs a vm-entry. ■ If the violation was due to an execution attempt, the hypervisor computes the hash of the violating physical page and looks for the resultant hash in its white-list database. If a match is found, the hypervisor then removes the write rights from the violating page, grants it execute rights, and performs a vm-entry. If a match is not found and the violation occurred in user mode, the hypervisor injects a general-protection fault to the guest OS. Otherwise, if the violation occurred in kernel mode, the hypervisor freezes up the system. Typically, the OS reacts to general protection in user mode by stopping the running process.
OS Kernel Monitoring
When it comes to kernel mode, enforcing an unauthorized execution cannot always be done lazily (i.e., only at the time of a violation). In kernel mode, some actions are time critical. For example, acknowledging an interrupt to the programmable interrupt controller cannot cause an EPT violation, as interrupt requests of equal or lower priority will not be generated until the page is given execution rights and an acknowledgment is sent to the PIC. Recall that the hypervisor initializes the EPT such that the entire guest physical address space has write-only access rights. That is to say, potentially time-critical kernel code will trigger a vm-exit due to an EPT violation upon execution attempt. To overcome this issue, the hypervisor verifies the kernel code pages and grants these pages execution rights.
Because we compiled the needed kernel modules statically into the kernel, there should be no more EPT violations due to kernel execution attempts. Nevertheless, if such an attempt is encountered, the hypervisor simply freezes up the machine.
Security
We consider an attacker who has 1) remote access to the machine and 2) full control over the OS kernel and peripherals. In addition, we assume that the UEFI firmware is trusted. We argue that given the described attacker and the assumption of full control, the described system can withstand 1) malicious code execution in user mode or kernel mode and 2) attacks that involve malicious DMA memory writes using peripherals.
In this article, we assume that the UEFI firmware is trusted. This assumption can be relaxed by integrating a hardware root of trust method into our system. An example of such a method is the Intel Boot Guard technology, which allows verification of the boot process by flashing a public key into a one-time programmable memory. In this way, the firmware code is verified on each subsequent boot. Obviously, once enabled, Intel Boot Guard cannot be disabled. We argue that the described system will prevent any unknown malicious code in user mode or kernel mode from executing.
Our method, being a white-list system, prevents execution of unauthorized code. However, attacks in which the attacker manipulates the control flow of a program (e.g., by causing a return instruction to pass control to existing code of the attacker's choosing) are possible. In the "Limitations and Future Work" section, we discuss how our system can be further extended to provide protection from such attacks.
Hypervisor Memory Protection
SLAT is a mechanism implemented as part of hardwareassisted virtualization technology to reduce the overhead of managing the hypervisor's guest page tables. SLAT is supported by Intel (EPT), AMD (RVI), and ARM (Stage-2 page tables). Simply put, SLAT allows the hypervisor to control the mapping of physical page addresses as they are perceived by the guest (known as guest physical address) to real physical page addresses (known as host physical address). Using SLAT in a virtualized environment (i.e., controlled by a hypervisor) is analogous to using virtual page tables in a process in a nonvirtualized environment (i.e., controlled by an OS). Figure 3 details the guest's address translation process.
The IOMMU is a memory management unit that stands between DMA-capable peripherals and the main memory. In this sense, it functions as a virtual page table for devices. DMA is a hardware mechanism that allows peripherals to access the main memory directly without going through the processor. The IOMMU allows the OS or hypervisor to set paging structures for the peripherals. That is, the peripherals will access a virtual address (also known as an I/O address) that will be translated by the IOMMU.
To protect itself against malicious modifications, the hypervisor configures both the EPT and the IOMMU so that its sensitive memory regions are not mapped and, therefore, are not accessible either from the guest or from a hardware device.
Secure Boot
Secure boot is a feature provided by UEFI that allows a computer system owner to authenticate UEFI applications prior to their execution, thereby protecting the executable image from malicious modifications. The first phase in the UEFI boot process is the firmware initialization phase. This is also called the security (SEC) phase, because it serves as the basis for the root of trust. After the completion of the SEC phase, the trust is maintained via public-key cryptography.
The UEFI secure boot feature is essential for the security of our system. Consider, for example, an attacker who has remote root access to a machine connected to the media that contain the UEFI application. That attacker can mount the partition on which the UEFI application . Physical page A contains code that was previously authenticated by the hypervisor; therefore, it has read/ execute rights. Physical page B has yet to be executed; therefore, it has read/write rights. Physical page C contains the hypervisor's code and data; therefore, it has read-only rights. HPAS: hypervisor physical address space; GPAS: guest physical address space; IOPAS: I/O physical address space.
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Performance
The proposed system goes into action when an EPT violation occurs. Recall that, due to the nature of our method, a page can be either executable or writable but not both. Therefore, all EPT violations are the result of an attempt to write or to execute. Whenever a page requires execution rights, the hypervisor computes its hash and searches for a match within the white-list database. When a page requests write rights, the hypervisor simply removes its execution rights and grants it write rights instead.
In the first experiment, we tried to estimate the induced overhead due to the aforementioned process by forcing the OS to page-out a code page every time it was accessed. This had to be brought up from the disk and written to memory before it could be executed. The results show that the extra overhead was negligible compared to the time it took to read the page from the disk and write it to memory.
In the second experiment, we performed an empirical evaluation of the system. We picked an open-source benchmarking application and ran several types of benchmarks to assess the impact of our system on a randomly selected computer. The results show that the induced overhead was negligible. All experiments were performed in the following environment: ■ CPU: Intel Core i5-4570 CPU @ 3.20 GHz (only one of four physical cores was enabled) ■ random-access memory: 8 GB ■ OS: Ubuntu 16.04.4 LTS with customized kernel 4.15.10 as described in the "Preparations" section.
Page Verification Forcing Experiment
In this experiment, we took a large executable file (10 MB) and modified one of its code pages such that the first byte of the page was 0xc3 (return-from-procedure opcode in x86). We wrote an application that requests a mapping of the aforementioned file into its virtual address space with full access rights (read, write, and execute). Next, using the fadvise64 system call, we instructed the OS not to keep the file in memory. The size of the file, along with the advise, caused the access to any page within the mapped file to generate a major page fault (i.e., it forced the OS to access the disk). Then, using rdtsc, we measured the number of cycles it took to perform the call to our modified page and return, both with and without active page verification. We ran the application a total of 100,000 times. As can be seen by the results presented in Figure 4 , the performance penalty of the active page verification was less than 1%.
Empirical Evaluation
In this experiment, we tested the system in three scenarios: As can be seen in the results reported in Figure 5 , the performance penalty of the hypervisor was no more than 5% compared to no hypervisor, whereas the performance penalty of the hypervisor with page verification was an increase of no more than 2% above the penalty from the hypervisor only.
Limitations and Future Work
Our method suffers from several limitations. These limitations and possible solutions are described in the next paragraphs.
Symmetric Multiprocessing Support
Our method currently supports only one processor.
Recall that whenever an EPT violation occurs, the processor needs to update the EPT structures with the correct access rights (write or execute). The processor may cache information from the EPT paging structures. That is, in a multiprocessor system, the processor that caused the violation will have to gather all the processors to make sure that their internal caches are flushed after setting up the new rights. This process is very common and is usually referred to as a translation lookaside buffer (TLB) shootdown. Due to the relatively high turnover of user mode pages, this gathering process can induce significant overhead. A possible optimization to the aforementioned performance problem is based on the fact that it is not always necessary for all processors to have an identical EPT paging structure at any given point in time, as we do not modify the actual mappings but only the access rights. For example, if processor A needs to set execution rights for a physical page x, and processor B has only read rights for physical page x, then processor A can freely modify its EPT paging structure without gathering processor B.
Support for Other OSs
Supporting other OSs is indeed possible, as we do not perform any modifications whatsoever to the running kernel. However, other OSs may behave differently, both in kernel mode and user mode. For example, Windows may modify the program's code at load time. These modifications, however, are not difficult to handle, because all information about them is located within the PE file. In addition, they all take place only at load time. Examples of such modifications are relocations and security cookies that, if they exist, are stored within the PE executable file. The relocations are stored within a special section, while the security cookies are stored in a PE data directory.
Despite the security consequences of having both code and writable data on the same page (for example, this arrangement breaks Data Execution Prevention), there are still OSs on which this is possible. The latter may introduce two problems to our current method: 1) a partial code page and 2) a self-modifying page. If the data part of a partial code page is modified during runtime, then its hash might not match. Figure 6 illustrates the problem.
Consider this same scenario, but this time page A modifies its own data. As a result, the system enters an infinite write/execute EPT violation loop. The second problem becomes like the first problem by emulating the write operation. However, the bigger challenge is to decide whether the written data are legitimate or malicious. We argue that the executable scanner can be modified to support legitimate runtime modifications.
Managed Code
Our method is very efficient and effective when execution of native code is considered, because it is executed directly by the processor. On the other hand, managed and interpreted code is typically executed by another application, usually referred to as a virtual machine. If the virtual machine itself is signed, then the hypervisor will allow it to freely execute possibly malicious code. A possible solution to managed and interpreted code is to store the hashes of the managed and interpreted code within the white-list database. The hypervisor can intercept the virtual machine application attempts to load the code and can perform a hash validation. The hypervisor can possibly detect such attempts by intercepting system calls within the guest OS. This solution, however, will not handle cases in which the interpreted code is compiled into native code (i.e., just-in-time code).
Control Flow and Data Integrity
Our method guarantees that no malicious modifications will be undertaken to executing code (both in user mode and kernel mode). However, our method does not provide user-mode and kernel-mode control flow and data integrity. For example, an attacker may modify the contents of the .got section, thus affecting the control flow of a program. Thankfully, control flow integrity is a heavily researched subject, and many effective solutions exist. 14, 15 We believe that such attacks can be mitigated by combining our method with a method that guarantees control flow integrity. Our system can then be used to enforce authorized code execution on this method.
ARM Architecture
Our method can be ported to the ARM architecture on devices that implement the virtualization extensions (e.g., most of today's smartphones). ARM virtualization extensions provide capabilities similar to those of Intel VT-x. For example, they provide a mechanism similar to Intel EPT for guest physical address (IPA in ARM terminology) to host physical address translation. The ARM Security Extensions, known as TrustZone, provide a way to create an isolated environment in which sensitive applications can execute. This isolated environment executes at the highest privilege level (higher than the hypervisor) and is not subject to virtualization. For this latter reason, for better security guarantees, our system might use TrustZone in addition to a hypervisor.
Other Applications
Our method can be further extended to provide other useful security applications. An example of such application is a sandbox for runtime analysis of malware. This can be done by entering a special monitor mode in case of an execution violation. In monitor mode, the behavior of the violating process may be inspected. Examples of potentially interesting behaviors are system calls initiated by the process and code executed by the process.
W
e have seen that current white-list-based systems have deficiencies that make them impractical, particularly in the case of code-modification attacks. We described a system that will prevent any unauthorized native code from being executed. We explained in detail how the specified system can be installed and even verified on each subsequent boot. We also showed that the performance overhead of the proposed system is negligible. The reported system has a few limitations. However, as mentioned, most of these limitations can be overcome without much effort. The proposed system can be further extended to provide other useful security applications. We believe that in addition to VMX, the Intel SGX can be used to provide data integrity for user mode applications. Figure 6 . Page A is a partial code page (i.e., it contains both code and data). Initially, the data part has not yet been modified; therefore, H(A) is located within the white-list database. Later, the data part of page A is modified. Even though the code is left untouched, an execution attempt of A' will fail, as H(A') is not located in the white-list database. H: hash function.
